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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

BH HASID LLC,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant,
V.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO.
20 l 7CV298598

ARYEH KIEFFER, ADDISON CAPITAL
LLC, and ADDISON ADVISORS LLC,

Business Case Div. 1

Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
V.

HASID HOLDINGS, LLC and
RONI AVRAHAM,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
The above styled action is before the Court on the following pending motions: (1)
Defendants' Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Parties' Associated
Florida Action ("Defendants' Motion to Stay"); (2) Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Appeal; (3)
Plaintiffs Motion for Accounting; and (4) Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Having considered the entire record and argument of counsel at a
February 12, 2019 hearing in this matter, the Court finds as follows:
SUMMARY OFF ACTS
This suit arises out of a dispute regarding the business dealings of Plaintiff BH Hasid,
LLC ("Plaintiff'), Defendant Aryeh Kieffer ("Kieffer") and entities wholly owned and managed

by Kieffer, Defendants Addison Capital, LLC ("Addison Capital") and Addison Advisors, LLC
("Addison Advisors").'
In 2012, the parties agreed to purchase and renovate apartment complexes in the Atlanta

area. Ultimately, they purchased five Georgia properties, each owned by a separate Florida
limited liability company ("LLC"): BH Chamblee, LLC ("BH Chamblee") owns The Heights at
Chamblee property ("Chamblee Property"); BH Winston Manor, LLC ("BH Winston Manor")
owns the Winston Manor property ("Winston Manor Property"); Addison Hasid IV, LLC ("AH
IV") owns the Washington Arms property ("Washjngton Arms Property"); Addison Hasid V,
LLC ("AH V") owns the Roosevelt property ("Roosevelt Property"); and Addison Hasid VI,
LLC ("AH VI") owns the Sierra Ridge property ("Sierra Ridge Property").2
The parties' agreement as to the terms of their relationship was memorialized in a written
agreement in Hebrew ("Hebrew Agreement"). Although there is only one signed Hebrew
Agreement in existence and it expressly concerns the first property the parties purchased, the
Chamblee Property, the parties agree that the terms of the Hebrew Agreement governed certain
terms of their partnership. Specifically, Kieffer testified that the parties' agreement was that
Tzion Hasid would contribute 90% of the purchase price of the properties and that Kieffer would
contribute the remaining 10%.3 It also undisputed that Kieffer, via his entity Addison Capital,
would serve as the manager of the Subject Entities and the Subject Properties.
In addition to the Hebrew Agreement, there exists an operating agreement for each of the
Throughout this Order, Defendants will be referred to collectively as "Defendants."
The five LCCs are referred to collectively herein as the "Subject Entities" and the five properties are
collectively referred to as the "Subject Properties."
3
Q: My understanding is that you testified that you had an informal agreement with Mr. Hasid to contribute
IO percent of the capital for the five entities, right?
A: I would say subsequent to the Chamblee deal, it was an understanding between the two ofus.
Q: That understanding was based on the Hebrew Agreement in part, right?
A: It was based on our conversation that this is what the terms of our partnership would be.
2

Kieffer Deposition, 25: 16-25 (April I 0, 2018).

2

five Subject Entities the parties created to own the five Subject Properties (the "OAs"). The OAs,
on their face, appear to contain two categories of signatures: for "THE COMP ANY" (specific
entity) by Keiffer, in his capacity as a manager of Addison Capital, LLC, which in tum is the
manager of the specific entity; and for "THE MEMBERS" by Addison Capita], LLC, signed by
Kieffer as its manager, and BH Hasid LLC, signed by Tzion Hasid, as the manager for Hasid
Brothers Atlanta LTD, which in turn is the manager for BH Hasid, LLC. However, Plaintiff
disputes their enforceability and alleges that Tzion Hasid was fraudulently induced into signing
them.
The record before this Court reflects that Kieffer secured his portion of the capital
contributions for the five entities from loans. A total of three loans were taken out - the PrivCap
loan, the Resurgens loan, and the Silver Point loan (collectively the "Loans").
PrivCap Loan
The PrivCap loan was issued in December 2012, the day before BH Hasid and Addison
Capital closed on the purchase of the Chamblee Property. The borrower on the loan was BH
Chamblee and the loan was secured by the Chamblee Property. Kieffer was a personal guarantor
on the loan. When BH Chamblee took out the Resurgens loan in April 2013, a portion of it was
used to pay off the PrivCap loan.
Resurgens Loan
The Resurgens loan was issued in April 2013 as a construction loan for the Chamblee
Property. The Resurgens loan was secured by the Chamblee Property and was guaranteed by the
Alexanders, the parties' former business partners who are not parties to this litigation. At its
highest, the Resurgens loan reached $2.2 million. The record reflects that a distribution of
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$50,000 was made out of the proceeds of the Resurgens loan to Tzion Hasid.4

Silver Point Loan
The Silver Point loan was issued in June 2015 to BH Chamblee as borrower and was
guaranteed by the Roosevelt, Sierra Ridge, and Chamblee Properties.' The initial amount of the
loan was over $6 mil." The Silver Point loan was increased on several occasions and as of the
April 2018 Hearing, the balance on the loan was a little over $9 million.7
CHOICE OF LAW
The parties agree that Florida law applies to the substantive issues presented in the
pending motions given a Florida choice of law provision in the OAs.8 However, Defendants
additionally contend that Florida law also applies to the procedural issues before this Court.
It is well established law that "[u]nder traditional choice of law principles, the law of the

forum State governs on matters of procedure." Keeton v. Hustler Magazine. Inc., 465 U.S. 770,
778, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1480, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984); see also Continental Ins. Co. v. Equity
Residential Properties Trust, 255 Ga. App. 445, 565 S.E.2d 603 (2002) ("The rule of lex fori
dictates that Georgia courts will apply Georgia law governing procedural or remedial matters.");
Brinson v. Martin, 220 Ga. App. 638, 469 S.E.2d 537 (1996) ("Under the rule of lex Jori,
procedural or remedial questions are governed by the law of the forum, the state in which the
action is brought"). Accordingly, in considering the parties' motions the Court applies Florida
law as to substantive matters and Georgia law on matters of procedure.
Kieffer Deposition, 152:3-10 (April I 0, 2018).
Hearing Transcript, 169: 1-6; 180:7-9 (April 11, 2018).
6
Kieffer Deposition, 183:10-18 (April 10, 2018).
7
Kieffer Deposition, 155: 12-14 (April I 0, 2018).
8
Operating Agreement of Addison Hasid V, LLC, ,33 ("This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in
accordance with the laws of the State of Florida."); Operating Agreement of Addison Hasid IV, LLC, ~33 ("This
Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Florida."); Amended
Operating Agreement of BH Chamblee, LLC, ~33 ("This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in accordance
with the laws of the State of Florida."); Addison Hasid IV, LLC and BH Winston Manor, LLC do not contain choice
of law provisions.
5

4

I.

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS PENDING THE
RESOLUTION OF THE PARTIES' ASSOCIATED FLORID A ACTION

Defendants move the Court to stay this action pending the resolution of a related but later
filed Florida case. Specifically, although this action was filed on Dec. 1, 2107, in January 2018
Defendants filed a separate action in Florida seeking judicial dissolution of the Subject Entities
under Florida law ("Florida Lawsuit").9 Defendants assert that insofar as the Subject Entities are
Florida LLCs that were organized in Florida and are governed by Florida law, and given the
parties' inability to work together, it was necessary to file the Florida Lawsuit to obtain
"complete relief', namely the dissolution of the Subject Entities. 10
Defendants contend the Florida court is best situated to rule on the matters at issue in this
case because the parties' dispute in this Court is not about the Subject Properties but rather
concerns ownership in the Subject Entities, their formation and management, and their
dissolution. Defendants assert this Court "does not have subject matter jurisdiction to properly
adjudicate BH Hasid's request of the Court to make a declaration that Addison Capital is not a
member of the limited liability companies."11 Defendants further urge that judicial economy and
comity warrant a stay of this action because only the Florida court has the power to resolve the
core issue between the parties-ownership of the Subject Entities.
"The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants. How this can best be done calls for the exercise of judgment, which
must weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." Bloomfield v. Liggett & Mvers.
Inc., 230 Ga. 484, 484, 198 S.E.2d 144, 145 (1973) (citing Landis v. North American Company,
9

See Addison Capital, LLC v. BH Hasid, LLC. Case No. 50-2018-CA-000324-XXXX-MB, Circuit Court of
the I 5tl' Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida.
10
Defendants' Motion to Stay, p. 3.
11
Defendants' Motion to Stay, p. 12.
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299 U.S. 248,254, 57 S. Ct. 163, 166, 81 L. Ed. 153 (1936)).

"It is settled law that the priority of pending actions is determined by the dates of filing, if
service has been effected." Wheeler v. Wheeler, 229 Ga. 84, 85, 189 S.E.2d 427, 429 (1972)
(citations omitted); see also Sweat v. Barnhill, 171 Ga. 294(6), 155 S.E. 18; McFarland v.
McFarland, 151 Ga. 9(2), l 05 S.E. 596. However, a trial court has "discretion to stay a Georgia
proceeding pending the disposition of a prior pending action in another jurisdiction." Black v.
Black, 292 Ga. 691, 694-95, 740 S.E.2d 613, 618 (2013) (citing Flagg Energy Dev. Corp. v.
General Motors Corp., 223 Ga. App. 259, 261(2), 477 S.E.2d 402 (1996)); see also Bloomfield
v. Liggett & Myers. Inc., 129 Ga. App. 141, 141, 198 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1973) (affirming trial
court's stay of proceedings pending determination of suit previously :filed by defendants against
plaintiff in New York federal district coLU1 where plaintiffs claim arose out of transaction or
occurrence that was subject matter of defendants' suit against plaintiff in federal court).
Having considered the record and the authorities cited above, the Court finds Defendants
have not made the requisite showing that a stay of this case is warranted. Insofar as this action
was filed first and the Court has proper jurisdiction over the claims asserted in this matter, the
Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion to Stay.

II.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
Plaintiff moves this Court to dismiss Defendants' appeaJ from this Court's ruling granting

Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief. On April 11-12, 2018, the Court held a
comprehensive hearing on all pending motions and requests for preliminary injunctive relief
("April 2018 Hearing"). At the conclusion of the April 2018 Hearing, the Court issued an oral
ruling, granting Plaintiff's request for preliminary injunctive relief and removing Addison
Capital as manager of the Subject Properties during the pendency of this case. The oral ruling
was made the written order of the Court in its Order which was entered on April 24, 2018.
6

Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal the following day, April 25, 2018, and paid the cost
bill on May 7, 2018. However, Plaintiff asserts Defendants have failed to order and file the
necessary record (including transcripts from the April 11-12, 2018 Hearing) with the Court of
Appeals to perfect their appeal. Plaintiff contends Defendants have caused an unreasonable and
inexcusable delay in placing the case on the earliest possible appellate calendar such that the
appeal should be dismissed.
O.C.G.A. §5-6-48(c) provides in part:
No appeal shall be dismissed by the appellate court nor consideration of
any error therein refused because of failure of any party to cause the
transcript of evidence and proceedings to be filed within the time allowed
by law or order of court; but the trial court may, after notice and
opportunity for hearing, order that the appeal be dismissed where there has
been an unreasonable delay in the filing of the transcript and it is shown
that the delay was inexcusable and was caused by such party .
As summarized by the Court of Appeals of Georgia in PJ Servs .. Inc. v. Equity Techs.
Assocs .. Inc., 295 Ga. App. 214,671 S.E.2d 264 (2008):
Where there is a transcript of evidence and proceedings to be included in
the record on appeal, the appellant shall cause the transcript to be prepared
and filed ... within 30 days after filing of the notice of appeal. Pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 5-6-48(c), a trial court may, after notice and opportunity for
hearing, dismiss an appeal for failure to timely file a transcript when the
delay is unreasonable, inexcusable, and caused by the party seeking
the appeal.
Id. at 215. See also Mon-ell v. W. Servs .. LLC, 291 Ga. App. 369, 373, 662 S.E.2d 215, 218

(2008).
However, "[an] appeal should not be dismissed unless the delay is unreasonable so as to
affect the appeal itself. .. either by prejudicing a party's position or by causing the appeal to be
stale such as, by delaying just disposition of the case, by preventing placement of the case on the
earliest possible appellate court calendar, or by delaying the docketing of the appeal and hearing
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of the case by an appellate court." Coptic Const. Co. v. Rolle, 279 Ga. App. 454, 454-55, 631
S.E.2d 475, 476 (2006) (citations and internal punctuation omitted). See Jackson v. Beech

Aircraft Corp., 213 Ga. App. 172, 172-73, 444 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1994). "A delay of more than
30 days in filing a transcript as provided by O.C.G.A. § 5-6-42 'is prima facie unreasonable and
inexcusable, but this presumption is subject to rebuttal if the party comes forward with evidence
to show that the delay was neither unreasonable nor inexcusable."' PJ Servs .. Inc., 295 Ga. App.
at 216 (citing Kelly v. Dawson County, 282 Ga. 189,646 S.E.2d 53 (2007)).
Here, Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal on April 25, 2018 and the notice directed
the Clerk of Court to omit nothing from the record on appeal. Plaintiff filed its Motion to
Dismiss Appeal on October 23, 2018 and therein specifically cited Defendants' failure to order a
transcript of the court proceedings from April 11, 2018, the failure to pay for a transcript of the
court proceedings from April 12, 2018, and the failure to cause the transcripts to be filed with the
Court of Appeals of Georgia. As of the February 12, 20 I 9 hearing, 293 days had passed since
Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal but failed to perfect their appeal by filing the appropriate
record with the appellate court. The Court finds the delay in filing the relevant transcripts with
the Court of Appeals is prima facie unreasonable and inexcusable, was caused by Defendants,
has delayed the docketing of the appeal and hearing of the case by an appellate court, and has
prevented the placement of the case on the earliest possible appellate court calendar. Plaintiff's
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal is hereby GRANTED.

m.

PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED MOTION FOR ACCOUNTING
Plaintiff moves this Court to require Defendants to account for all funds held in certain

Bank of America accounts belonging to the Subject Entities. Plaintiff asserts that th.rough
Defendants Addison Capital and Addison Advisors, Defendant Kieffer controlled the following

8

ten bank accounts at Bank of America 12:
Entity Named on Account
(I)
(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

Addison Hasid VI, LLC
Addison Hasid V, LLC
BH Chamblee, LLC
BH Winston Manor, LLC
Addison Hasid IV, LLC
BH Chamblee, LLC
BH Chamblee, LLC
Addison Hasid, VI, LLC
Addison Hasid V, LLC
Addison Advisors, Inc.

Account
'9447
'9377

'6711
'5884
'5631
'4519
'4483
'4035
'3809
'0403

Given that the Court removed Defendants from management of the Subject Entities on
April 12, 2018 and thereafter Plaintiff BH Hasid appointed itself as the replacement manager,
Plaintiff contends it is entitled to an accounting of the funds held in the above accounts owned by
the Subject Entities and should have access to those funds which are necessary for the use and
maintenance of the Subject Properties. Further, whereas "[u]pon information and belief' all
funds in the '0403 account held by Addison Advisors "originated from BH Hasid and were
intended for capital contributions to one of the [Subject] Entities," Plaintiff argues it is also
entitled to an accounting as to that account and access to those funds.13 Defendants have not
responded to the Motion for Accounting.
Insofar as nine of the Bank of America Accounts listed above are held in the name of the
Subject Entities which are currently managed by Plaintiff BH Hasid and it appears that the funds
held in the '0403 held by Addison Advisors were provided by Plaintiff and intended as capital
contributions to the Subject Entities, Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Accounting is hereby
GRANTED. Defendants are ordered to provide an accounting as to the whereabouts and uses of

12
13

Collectively the "Bank of America Accounts."
Plaintiffs Amended Motion for Accounting, ~5.

9

all funds held in the Bank of Am erica Accounts identified above and transfer the funds held
therein to accounts under Plaintiff BR Hasid's control.
IV.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff BH Hasid and Counterclaim-Defendants Hasid Holdings, LLC and Roni

Avraham (collectively "Movants") move the Court to enter partial swnmary judgment in their
favor as to Plaintiff BH Hasid's declaratory judgment claim and on all of Defendants'
counterclaims.
A. Applicable Standard
Under Georgia law, summary judgment should be granted when the movant shows "that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law." O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(c).
A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents,
affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is
no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential
element of plaintiffs case. If there is no evidence sufficient to create a
genuine issue as to any essential element of plaintiffs claim, that claim
tumbles like a house of cards. All of the other disputes of fact are rendered
immaterial.
Scarbrough v. Hallam, 240 Ga. App. 829, 830, 525 S.E.2d 377, 378 (1999) (quoting Lau's Corp.
v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 491, 405 S.E.2d 474, 475-76 (1991), abrogated on other grounds
by Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735,493 S.E.2d 403 (1997)) (emphasis in original).
To avoid summary judgment, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Code
section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." O.C.G.A.
§9-11-56(e ). In reviewing the record, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Morgan v. Barnes, 221 Ga. App. 653, 654, 472 S.E.2d 480, 481 (1996).
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However, "[m]ere speculation, conjecture, or possibility (are] insufficient to preclude summary
judgment." State v. Rozier, 288 Ga. 767, 768 (2011) (quoting Rosales v. Davis, 260 Ga. App.
709,712,580 S.E.2d 662,665 (2003)); see Ellison v. Burger King Corp., 294 Ga. App. 814, 819,

670 S.E.2d 469,474 (2008); Pafford v. Biomet, 264 Ga. 540,544,448 S.E.2d 347,350 (1994).
B. Preliminary issues

1)

Burden ofProofas Lo Affirmative Defenses

Defendants assert the motion should be denied because Movants have failed to show that
Defendants' previously asserted defenses are legally insufficient. Defendants filed their
Amended Answer on November 13, 2018 and asserted the following affirmative defenses: all
defenses contained in O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-8 and 9-11-12; waiver and estoppel; unclean hands; the
parties had mutually departed from and all operating agreements; Plaintiff ratified the actions
complained of; Plaintiff failed to mitigate damages; Defendants were not the proximate cause of
Plaintiff's damages; Plaintiff frustrated Defendants' performance; lack of equity; business
judgment rule; acquiescence; and that Plaintiff failed to act in a commercially reasonable
manner.
As noted earlier, Georgia law applies to the procedural issues before this Court. As to
affirmative defenses, it is well established that once a plaintiff as movant has established a prima
facie right to judgment as a matter of law "the burden shift[s] to [the nonmovant] to produce or
point to evidence in the record which establishe[s] an affirmative defense." Secured Realty Inv.
v. Bank ofN. Georgia, 314 Ga. App. 628, 629-30, 725 S.E.2d 336, 339 (2012) (citing to Helton
v. Jasper Banking Co., 311 Ga. App. 363, 363-364, 715 S.E.2d 765 (2011); see also Reece v.
Chestatee State Bank, 260 Ga. App. 136, 138(1), 579 S.E.2d 11 (2003); Miller v.
Calhoun/Johnson Co., 230 Ga. App. 648, 649-650(3)(b), 497 S.E.2d 397 (1998). Thus, under
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Georgia law, Defendants have the burden of proof with respect to their affirmative defenses.

2)

Pending Discovery

Defendants argue that this Court may not decide the instant motion because discovery has
not been completed and there are still depositions that are outstanding. However, a trial court is
not required to wait until the end of the prescribed discovery period before ruling on summary
judgment. Govindasamy v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 311 Ga. App. 452, 453-54, 715 S.E.2d 737,
739-40 (2011). A plaintiff may move for summary judgment "at any time, after the expiration of
30 days from the commencement of the action." Id. (citing to OCGA § 9-l 1-56(a)). If a
respondent requires further discovery to properly respond to a summary judgment motion,
possible responses may include filing a motion to extend the time to respond to the motion, a
motion to compel if the responses are overdue, or an affidavit pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-11-56(-f)
setting forth why the respondent is unable to proceed without further discovery. Govindasamy,
311 Ga. App. at 454 (affirming the grant of a motion for swnmary judgment and noting that the
record did not reveal any effort on the part of the appellant to secure a ruling from the trial court
on his request for a continuance, nor did the record indicate that the appellant objected to the trial
court hearing the motion for summary judgment prior to obtaining the responses to his Requests
for Admissions, and thus he had not preserved this issue for appellate review).
Here, as noted in the Court's December 3, 2018 Order on Pending Motions and Setting
Hearing,
[u]nder OCGA § 9-ll-56(a), a plaintiff may move for summary judgment
"at any time." "Thus, it is not unusual for discovery to be ongoing at the
time summary judgment motions are filed and/or ruled upon." Corry v.
Robinson. 207 Ga.App. 167, 170(3), 427 S.E.2d 507 (1993). But when a
party is "faced with a motion for summary judgment and the unavailability
of evidence to rebut such motion," a party must seek relief under OCGA §
9-11-56(±). NationsBank. N.A. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ga .. N.A., 226
Ga.App. 888, 895(2), 487 S.E.2d 701 (1997) (physical precedent only).
12

915 Indian Trail. LLC v. State Bank & Tr. Co., 328 Ga. App. 524, 533-34, 759 S.E.2d 654, 662
(2014). Defendants have not satisfied O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-56(f) nor have they demonstrated grounds
wan-anting any further continuance of this matter.

3)

Governing Contract

Defendants assert that the Motion for Summary Judgment should fail because there is a
genuine issue of material fact as to which of the existing agreements governs the parties'
relationship. Defendants assert that the OAs the parties signed for each of the Subject Entities
governs the parties' conduct and this dispute. Movants dispute the validity of the OAs asserting
that Mr. Hasid's signature on those agreements was fraudulently obtained. Instead, Movants
assert the Hebrew Agreement governs.
Insofar as the declaratory judgment claim asks this Court to make a finding as to the
parties' ownership interests in the Subject Entities, the only agreement that discusses the subject
matter is the Hebrew Agreement. Thus, this Court can make a ruling on the declaratory judgment
claim without deciding which of the subsequent OAs govern and/or are valid and whether the
English agreements superseded the Hebrew one.
This approach is consistent with the merger rule. Under the merger rule, "[a]n existing
contract is superseded and discharged whenever the parties subsequently enter upon a valid and
inconsistent agreement completely covering the subject-matter embraced by the original
contract." Atlanta Integrity Mortg .. Inc. v. Ben Hill United Methodist Church, 286 Ga. App. 795,
797, 650 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2007) ("the Customer Fee Agreement and the Commitment Letter did
not purport to cover the same subject matter.") (quoting Hennessy v. Woodruff, 210 Ga. 742,
744(1), 82 S.E.2d 859 (1954) (citation and punctuation omitted.l); see also Wallace v. Bock, 279
Ga. 744, 745(1), 620 S.E.2d 820 (2005). "The rational basis for the merger rule is that where
13

parties enter into a final contract[,] all prior negotiations, understandings, and agreements on the
same subject matter are merged into the final contract, and are accordingly extinguished."
Wallace, 279 Ga. at 745(1).
Notably, Georgia courts require "a showing of more than a similarity of subject matter."
Wallace, 279 Ga. at 746. In order for the merger rule to apply, the parties of the merging
contracts must be the same and the terms of those contracts must completely cover the same

subject matter and be inconsistent. Id. at 745-746(1 ), 620 S.E.2d 820 (holding that a purchase
agreement and subsequent escrow agreement dealing with real property did not merge because
the purchase agreement included an obligation to complete construction and convey title, while
the escrow agreement dealt only with the construction) (emphasis added); see also Noorani CStores v. Trico v. Petroleum, 281 Ga. App. 635, 640(3), 637 S.E.2d 208 (2006) (holding that one
corporation cannot rely on a merger clause in a contract entered into by another corporation).
Here, the terms to of the required capital contributions are only discussed in the Hebrew
Agreement. Thus, because the Hebrew Agreement and the OAs do not cover the same subject
matter and are not inconsistent, this Court can rule on the declaratory judgment claim as a matter
of law without making a finding as to the validity and enforceability of the OAs. Additionally,
insofar as Kieffer has stated on the record under oath that the Hebrew Agreement reflected the
agreement of the parties' as to their respective obligations in the context of their partnership,
specifically regarding the required capital contributions, the validity and enforceability of the
Hebrew Agreement are not in dispute. 14

14

Q: My understanding is that you testified that you had an informal agreement with Mr. Hasid to contribute
JO percent of the capital for the five entities, right?
A: I would say subsequent to the Chamblee deal, it was an understanding between the two of us.
Q: That understanding was based on the Hebrew Agreement in part, right?
A: It was based on our conversation that this is what the terms of our partnership would be.

Kieffer Deposition, 25: 16-25 (Apri I I 0, 2018).
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C. Analysis and Conclusions of Law

I)

Declaratory Judgment Claim

In count IX of the First Amended Complaint ('"FAC"), Movants, relying on the Hebrew
Agreement, assert Addison Capital contractually committed itself to contribute 10% cash in
capital contributions to each of the Subject Entities. However, Movants allege it failed and/or
refused to make any capital contributions and, thus, as a matter of law it "never became a
member of any of the [Subject Entities]."15 According to Movants, Addison Capital "has no
legal or equitable interest in any of the Subsidiaries."16 Movants further contend that BH Hasid
owed no fiduciary duty to Addison Capital and Addison Capital should be estopped from making
such affirmative defenses or counterclaims in this action. 17 Movants submit that Addison
Capital's failure to make capital contributions is a breach of the Hebrew Agreement.
Addison Capital disputes Movants' allegations and asserts there are unresolved issues of
fact as to: i) the amounts and forms of the required capital contributions; ii) whether Tzion Hasid
waived its right to disqualify Addison Capital; and iii) whether Tzion Hasid ratified the form of
Addison Capital's capital contributions. Kieffer, owner and member of Addison Capital, further
responds that the proceeds from the loans qualify as a capital contribution because the proceeds
were distributable cash as defined in the OAs. Kieffer elaborates that the Loan proceeds are "the
property disbursements to the members ... [s]o ... 20% of that money was to be [his] money ..
. " which he immediately reinvested in the business. Hearing Transcript, 168:9-12 (April 11,
2018); Id. at 132:8-9 ("20 percent of that cash belongs to me. And all that 20 percent has been
reinvested in all the properties"); Kieffer Deposition, 26: 11-16 (April 10, 2018) ("I have
maintained for several years that cash out of proceeds from refinancing is intended to be
15
16
17

FAC, ,r166.
FAC, if 167.
FAC, 1168.
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distributed and dispersed between the partn ers. When it gets reallocated into the same or other
projects, it is on behalf of the partner's interest"); Id. at 27:8-10 ("When cash came from
refinance and should have been dispersed according to our percentages. That cash gets
reallocated and put back in").
i)

BH Chamblee, LLC - "Heights al Chamblee"

The Chamblee property was purchased in December 2012. It is undisputed that Addison
Capital's required capital contribution was made from the proceeds of the PrivCap loan.18
Defendants argue that Aryeh Kieffer's "understanding ... [was] that he was simply expected to
provide financing of any kind in the amount of ten (I 0) percent of the total venture cost .... "19
Thus, Defendants argue there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the form of the required
capital contribution.

Movants respond that the PrivCap loan does not qualify as a capital

contribution as a matter of law because it was issued in BH Chamblee's name as a "borrower"
and the Chamblee Property was used as collateral for the PrivCap loan.
The agreement that speaks to the parties' respective obligations regarding capital
contributions is the Hebrew Agreement the parties entered into when they purchased the
Chamblee Property. Section 7.1 of the Hebrew Agreement notes that "[a]n initial investment
amount ... will be invested by the parties ... each according to his part ... " Thus, at issue here
is whether a loan can be considered a capital contribution by a member into an LLC where the
LLC is listed as borrower and real estate owned by the LLC is the collateral for the loan.
Florida courts have held that a capital contribution is defined as "[c]ash, property, or
services contributed by partners to a partnership." Wells Fargo Bank. N.A. v. Palm Beach Mall,
LLC, 177 So. 3d 3 7, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ( citing to Black's Law Dictionary 23 7 (9th
18

Kieffer Deposition, 28:3-7 (April I 0, 2018); Hearing Transcript, 120:4-12 (April 11, 20 I 8).
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Roni Avraham's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Defendants' Response"), p. 30-31.
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ed.2009) ("Palm Beach Mall"). However, for cash to qualify as a capital contribution it must
become part of the entity's assets and must be given "without the expectation of repayment."
Palm Beach Mall, 177 So. 3d at 51 (finding that a loan from a member to the entity is a capital
contribution where the loan increased the member's equity in the entity and it also became part
of the entity's assets, expressly noting that the member contributed the cash "without the
expectation of repayment"). Florida courts have also held that transfers without consideration
are capital contributions. Reed v. Honoshofsky, 76 So. 3d 948,951 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) In
contrast, "[c]ontributions in the form of education, experience, daily operation, and ability to
obtain loans constitute expertise ... [are] not capital contributions." Agric. Land Servs., Inc. v.
State, Dep't of Transp., 715 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis added).
Whether a security constitutes equity or debt depends on the interpretation of the contract
between the corporation and the security holders. In re SubMicron Systems Corp., 291 B.R. 314
(D. Del. 2003), aff'd, 432 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2006). In interpreting the contract, the court
considers the name given to the instrument, the intent of the parties, the presence or absence of a
fixed maturity date, the right to enforce payment of principal and interest, and the certainty of
payment in the event of the corporation's insolvency or liquidation. In re SubMicron Systems
Corp., 291 B.R. 314 (D. Del. 2003), aff'd, 432 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2006).
Here, at the time the Chamblee Property was purchased, the property itself and the owner
entity, BH Chamblee, were subject to the PrivCap loan. It is undisputed by the parties that Tzion
Hasid contributed the required $2.16 million toward the purchase price. Defendants contend that
Addison Capital's 10% required contribution, $240,000, was satisfied through the proceeds from
the PrivCap loan." However, unlike in Palm Beach Mall where the cash contributed by the
member "became part of [the entity's] assets," here, the PrivCap loan served to increase BH
20

Hearing Transcript, 120:9-12 (April 11, 2018).
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Chamblee's debts instead. Additionally, the loan was not issued to BH Chamblee "without the
expectation of repayment," instead, the loan document specifically indicates the presence of a
fixed maturity date, the tight to enforce payment of principal and interest, etc.

In fact, it is

undisputed that the PrivCap loan was repaid by BH Chamblee by means of another loan also
taken out by BH Chamblee as borrower. 21
The Court is not persuaded by Defendants' argument that the loan proceeds qualified as
distributions. Even assuming that the OAs are valid and enforceable, the agreements contemplate
a distribution only in certain circumstances.
In the event of a refinancing, recapitalization, or other capital restructure resulting
in availability of distributable cash, Cash Available shall be distributed to the
Members in accordance with the following:
(a) First, to the repayment of any mortgage loan, notes, liens, payables, or other
debts or liabilities ...
(b) Second, to the establishment of any reserve that the Members may determine
to be reasonably necessary and adequate for any contingent liabilities ...
(c) Third, to the Members on a pro-rata basis to the extent of their Percentage
Interest ...
Operating Agreement of Addison Hasid IV LLC, iJ20; Operating Agreement of BH Chamblee,
iJ20; Operating Agreement of Winston Manor, LLC, iJ20; Operating Agreement of Addison
Hasid V, LLC, iJ20; Operating Agreement of Addison Hasid VI, iJ20. It is clear from the record
that there were outstanding obligations such that no proper distributions could be made pursuant
to subsection (c) above.
Defendants also alleges the PrivCap loan is a proper capital contribution because even
though the loan was issued to BH Chamblee and secured by BH Chamblee's property, it was
personally guaranteed by Kieffer. In support, Kieffer points out that the loan was not a true
arms-length transaction, evident by the fact that the loan, although seemed by the property, was

21

Hearing Transcript, 133: 1-11 (April 11, 2018).
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issued before BI-I Chamblee acquired the property. Thus, Kieffer asserts, the loan was issued to
him as a result of his relationship with the lender. Hearing Transcript, 124: 13-17 (April 11,
2018) ("As far as I knew, I was borrowing the funds ... That was a loan made to me, personally to
me, that I personally guaranteed."); Kieffer Deposition, 40: 18, 24 (April 10, 2018) ("It was
primarily a relationship-based loan.")

However, the "ability to obtain loans constitute[s]

expertise" and does not qualify as a capital contribution to the business. Agric. Land Servs., lnc.,
715 So. 2d at 298. Thus, even if the Court construes aU evidence in favor of Defendants as the
non-rnovant, the PrivCap does not qualify as a capital contribution as a matter of law.
Defendants assert, in the alternative, if this Court finds that Addison CapitaJ did not make
capital contributions in the proper form and/or amount, the Court should nonetheless find that
Tzion Hasid waived his right to disqualify Addison Capital as a proper member when he
discovered the purported shortfall but nonetheless accepted a $50,000 distribution from the
Resurgens Loan. 22
"Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be established by
express statements or implied by conduct. An implied waiver is one shown by a party's decisive,
unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring the intent to waive." Mullis v. Bibb Cty., 294 Ga.
App. 721,725,669 S.E.2d 716, 720 (2008). Waiver "is essentially a matter of intent based upon
full knowledge of all the material facts, and the evidence relied upon to prove a waiver must be
so clearly indicative of an intent to relinquish a then known particular right or benefit as to
exclude any other reasonable explanation." Gilbert v. Canterbury Farms. LLC, 346 Ga. App.
804, 814, 815 S.E.2d 303,311 (2018), reconsideration denied (July 12, 2018) (citing Wyndham
Lakes Homeowners Assn .. Inc. v. Gray, 303 Ga. App. 45, 48 (2), 692 S.E.2d 704 (2010). Under
Georgia law, waiver is an affirmative defense and Defendants have the burden to "produce or
22
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point to evidence in the record which establishe[s] an affirmative defense." Secured Realty Inv.
v. Bank ofN. Georgia, 314 Ga. App. 628, 629-30, 725 S.E.2d 336,339 (2012) (citing to Helton
v. Jasper Banking Co., 311 Ga. App. 363, 363-364, 715 S.E.2d 765 (2011); see also Reece v.
Chestatee State Bank, 260 Ga. App.

136,

138(1), 579 S.E.2d

11

(2003); Miller v.

Calhoun/Johnson Co., 230 Ga. App. 648, 649-650(3)(b), 497 S.E.2d 397 (1998).
In dispute here is whether the proceeds from the PrivCap Loan constitute a proper and
legally cognizable capital contribution on behalf of Kieffer and Addison Capital. Defendants'
only citation to the record is to Kieffer's April 10, 2018 deposition where Kieffer states that he
discussed the distribution with Tzion Hasid and that Tzion Hasid wanted to get the $50,000
distribution from the Resurgens loan. However, Defendants have not pointed to any evidence in
the record that would indicate Tzion Hasid had full knowledge of all the material facts
surrounding the PrivCap loan. To the contrary, Defendants admit that Tzion Hasid was not aware
of the existence of the PrivCap loan at the time of either the PrivCap loan transaction or the
Resurgens loan transaction. (Kieffer Deposition, 44:4-5 (April 10, 2018) (Q: [D]id you ever tell
Tzion Hasid that you were borrowing money from Privf'ap for your capital contribution? A: "I
don't believe I told him where it was from")
Defendants also assert an affirmative defense of ratification, arguing that Tzion Hasid
ratified the form of Addison Capital's capital contributions when Tzion Hasid accepted the
$50,000 distribution from the Resurgens Loan.
Ratification, the confirmation by one of an act performed by another without authority, is
an affirmative defense, and the burden of proving it is on the party asserting it. Hendrix v. First
Bank of Savannah, 195 Ga. App. 510,511,394 S.E.2d 134, 135 (1990) (citing Griggs v. Dodson,
223 Ga. 164, 169, 171(2), 154 S.E.2d 252 (1967). The ratification must be made by the principal
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with knowledge of the material facts, and "may be express or implied from the acts or silence of
the principal." O.C.G.A. § 10-6-52. "[I]f the principal, with fuJI knowledge of all the material

facts, accepts and retains the benefits of the unauthorized act, he thereby ratifies the act."
Hendrix v. First Bank of Savannah, 195 Ga. App. 510, 511, 394 S.E.2d 134, 135 (1990)
(emphasis added) (citing Hyer v. C & S Nat. Bank, 188 Ga. App. 452, 453, 373 S.E.2d 391
(1988)). Defendants assert there exists an issue of material fact as to when Tzion Hasid learned
about the details of the PrivCap transaction.
The issue is whether Tzion Hasid ratified the PrivCap loan and its serving as Addison
Capital's capital contribution by accepting the distribution from the Resurgens loan. As with
Defendants' waiver defense, to establish a defense of ratification Defendants must show that
Tzion Hasid "with full knowledge of all the material facts, accept[ ed] and retain[ed] the
benefits of the unauthorized act." Defendants have failed to point to evidence in the record
supporting all essential elements to this defense. By way of example, Defendants have failed to
show that Tzion Hasid had "full knowledge of all material facts" as it related to the PrivCap loan.
Finally, Defendants argue that even if this Court finds that Defendants did not make
proper capital contributions, and even if the Court finds that Tzion Hasid did not waive or ratify
the shortfalls of the capital contributions, the Court should nonetheless find that Defendants have
equity in the joint deal(s) as a result of Defendants having put "at least $60,000" into the
businesses. 23
Florida courts have held that "the proper relief [for the trial court to grant] would have
been to adjust the ownership in the venture in accordance with the funds actually advanced
[toward the purchase price] ... " Malkus v. Gaines, 434 So. 2d 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(instructed trial court to adjust ownership interest in accordance with the amount the parties
23
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contributed when purchasing the property) (citing to Donahue v. Davis, 68 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1953)
("Equity should restore the parties by reallocating the stock to each party in the ratio that his
actual contribution bore to the actual purchase price of the property.t'j)
Here, the amount of $60,000 which Defendants refer to was contributed by Defendants in
relation to paying 10 percent of certain bills and liabilities, including, the Chamblee Property's
water and trash bills, City of Atlanta fines, and a payment toward an extension of the Silver Point
loan that became due in December 2017 .2'1 Insofar as these payments were made "since this
lawsuit has been filed?" and were not made toward "the actual purchase price of the property,"
the payments do not qualify as capital contributions and this Court does not need to consider
them when reallocating interest in the entity.
Insofar as the loans discussed above do not constitute a capital contribution, the Court
finds and declares that Defendants are not members of BH Chamblee, LLC.
ii)

BH Winston Manor, LLC - "Winston Manor"

Although the parties did not enter into a separate Hebrew Agreement in relation to the
purchase of Winston Manor, it is undisputed that the parties agreed that the terms of their
business relationship required Addison Capital to contribute 10 percent of the capital for each of
the Subject Entities and properties purchased subsequent to the Chamblee deal.
Q: My understanding is that you testified that you had an informal agreement with
Mr. Hasid to contribute 10 percent of the capital for the five entities, right?
A: I would say subsequent to the Chamblee deal, it was an understanding between
the two of us.
Q: That understanding was based on the Hebrew Agreement in part, right?
A: It was based on our conversation that this is what the terms of our partnership
would be.
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Hearing Transcript, 132: 14-16 (April 11, 2018) (Q: Since this lawsuit has been filed, you've put in between
50 and $60,000, right? A: That's correct.) (emphasis added).
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Hearing Transcript, 132:14-16 (April 11, 2018) (Q: Since this lawsuit has been filed, you've put in
between 50 and $60,000, right? A: That's correct.) (emphasis added).
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Kieffer Deposition, 25:16-25 (April 10, 2018).
BH Winston Manor purchased the Winston Manor Property on October 21, 2013 for an
adjusted purchase price of $542,000. That same day BH Hasid contributed $700,000 for the
purpose of purchasing the Winston Manor Property. Hearing Transcript, 137:6, 16-22; 139:1317 (April 11, 2018). Addison Capital did not make a cash contribution toward the purchase price.
Instead, Addison Capital contends that its portion of the purchase price was taken from the
proceeds of a second PrivCap loan. Hearing Transcript, 162: 19-22 (Q: "And you would agree
that you did not make a cash contribution towards the purchase of Winston Manor, correct?" A:
"Correct."); Kieffer Deposition, 43 :5, 10 (April 10, 2018) (Q: "How many other loans have
Addison or you done with PrivCap?" A:"The answer is two other loans ... Winston Manor and
Roosevelt Addison 5."). The borrower on this second PrivCap loan was BH Chamblee.
Again, the inquiry here is whether proceeds from a loan borrowed against the property
and issued to another entity (BH Chamblee, LLC) constitute a valid capital contribution. As held
above, even assuming the OAs are valid and enforceable, the record reflects that BH Chamblee
had outstanding obligations such that no proper distributions could be made pursuant to
subsection (c) of the operating agreement. The same analysis as summarized in Part IV(C)(l)(i),

supra, applies with respect to Defendants' required capital contribution to become a member of
BH Winston Manor, LLC. Insofar as the loans discussed above do not constitute a capital
contribution, the Court finds and declares that Defendants are not members of BH Winston
Manor, LLC.

iii)

Addison Hasid JV, LLC- "Washington Arms"

It is undisputed that the parties agreed that the terms of their partnership called for
Defendants to contribute IO percent of the capital for each of the Subject Entities and the
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properties purchased subsequent to the Chamblee deal."
The Washington Arm s Property was purchased on December 9, 2014 for a purchase price
of $170,000.27 BH Hasid made a contribution of $150,000 on November 21, 2014 to be used

toward the purchase of that property." The record is not clear which loan was used to supply
Defendants' ten percent share of the purchase price, however, it is not in dispute that Defendants
used loan proceeds for the pm-pose of a capital contributions, similarly to the other properties
discussed in this Order.
The same analysis as summarized in Part IV(C)(l)(i), supra, applies with respect to
Defendants' required capital contribution to become a member of Addison Hasid IV, LLC.
Insofar as the loans discussed above do not constitute a capital contribution, the Court finds and
declares that Defendants are not members of Addison Hasid IV, LLC.
iv)

Addison Hasid V, LLC - "Roosevelt"

The Roosevelt Property was pm-chased on July 1, 2015 for $440,000. Hearing Transcript,
145:21, 25 (April 11, 2018). The Hasids made a contribution of $100,000 on January 21, 2015,
presumably to be used toward the purchase price of Roosevelt. Despite a contribution from the
Hasids, the property was purchased entirely from the Silver Point Loan. Hearing Transcript,
147:6 (April 11, 2018). The Silver Point Loan was ultimately seemed by the Chamblee, Sierra
Ridge, and Roosevelt Properties. Hearing Transcript, 169: 1-6; 180:7-9 (April 11, 2018). The
borrower on the Silver Point loan was BH Chamblee, LLC. The same analysis as summarized in
Part IV(C)(l)(i), supra, applies with respect to Defendants' required capital contribution to
become a member of Addison Hasid V, LLC. Insofar as the loans discussed above do not
constitute a capital contribution, the Court finds and declares that Defendants are not members of
26
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Addison Hasid V, LLC.

v)

Addison Hasid VJ, LLC- "Sierra Ridge"

The Sierra Ridge Property was purchased on April 22, 2016 for $3.45 million. BH Hasid
made a contribution in the amount of $3.179 million toward the purchase of that property.
Hearing Transcript, 148:21-25; 149:12-20. (April 11, 2018). The record reflects that not all of
I-Iasid's contribution was used to purchase Sierra Ridge; instead $ 1. 15 million dollars from the
Silver Point Loan were used in the closing. Id. at 149:21-25. Defendants assert Addison Capital's
share of the capital contributions toward the purchase price was taken out of the proceeds from
the Silver Point loan. BH Chamblee was the borrower on the Silver Point Loan. The same
analysis as summarized in Part IV(C)(l)(i), supra, applies with respect to Defendants' required
capital contribution to become a member of Addison Hasid VI, LLC. Insofar as the loans
discussed above do not constitute a capital contribution, the Court finds and declares that
Defendants are not members of Addison Hasid VI, LLC.
Having considered the entire record and given the foregoing analysis, the Court
GRANTS the Movants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count IX of the First
Amended Complaint and enters a declaratory judgment in favor of BI-I Hasid, finding the record
demonstrates: that Addison Capital failed to contribute capital to the Subject Entities as agreed to
by the parties. Therefore the Court further finds that Addison Capital was never a member of the
Subject Entities; and that BH Hasid never owed Addison Capital a fiduciary duty with respect to
the Subject Entities.
2)

Counterclaims 1-7

Counterclaim-Defendants move this Court for summary judgment on all of Defendants'
counterclaims. Defendants have not responded to Movant's Motion for Partial Summary
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Judgment.

i)

Breach ofFiduciary Duty (against all CounterclaimDefendants)

Defendants allege that the Counterclaim-Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by
leaving the entities undercapitalized despite being aware of the financial status of each entity.
Additionally, Defendants allege that Avrabam improperly withdrew money from an account
owned by Addison Advisors without the permission of Addison Advisors.
Under Florida law, "[t]he elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are
(1) the existence of a duty, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) damages flowing from the breach."
Cassedy v. Alland Investments Corp., 128 So. 3d 976, 978 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing
Crusselle v. Mong, 59 So.3d 1178, 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011 )). See also Engelman v. Kessler,
340 Ga. App. 239, 246, 797 S.E.2d 160, 166 (2017), cert. denied (Aug. 14, 2017) (Under
Georgia law, "[i]t is well settled that a claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of three
elements: (I) the existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) damage
proximately caused by the breach") (citing Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 849-850 (2),
670 S.E.2d 508 (2008)).
Given this Court's ruling that Addison Capital is not a member of any of the Subject
Entities, any duties owed to it would arise out of Addison Capital's role as a manager of the
Subject Entities. Thus, the inquiry before this Court centers on what duties the non-managing
members of an entity owe the manager of that entity. In relation to the five Subject Entities, it is
undisputed BH Hasid was a member of each of the Subject Entities, Hasid Holdings was not
formed until November 2017 and had no role during the timeframe of the conduct alleged, and
Roni Avraham became BH Hasid's manager in October 2017.
Under Georgia law, "[i]f a member is not managing the affairs of the company, then no
26

such duty attaches." Inland Atl. Old Nat. Phase L LLC v. 6425 Old Nat., LLC, 329 Ga. App.
671,674, 766 S.E.2d 86, 90-91 (2014) (citing ULQ. LLC v. Meder, 293 Ga. App. 176, 184(7),
666 S.E.2d 713 (2008)). Moreover, unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement or
articles of organization, "where a member is not a manager in a company in which management
is vested in one or more managers ... that member shall have no duties to the limited liability
company or to the other members solely by reason of acting in his or her capacity as a member."
ULQ. LLC v. Meder, 293 Ga. App. 176, 184(7), 666 S.E.2d 713 (2008).
Thus, under Georgia law, BH Hasid, in its capacity as a non-managing member did not
owe a fiduciary duty to the Subject Entities, the other members, or the manager. Even if this
Court assumes the OAs are valid, none of them assign a duty owed by a non-managing member
to the manager. Georgia law is also silent as to the existence of any duty a non-managing
member owes the entity's manager. Under Florida law, "[ejach manager of a manager-managed
limited liability company and a member of a member-managed limited liability company owes
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to the limited liability company and members of the limited
liability company." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 605.04091. Florida law is silent as to any existing duty
owed to a manager of an entity by the members of the entity.
Having considered the record and given the Court's rulings in this case, the Court finds
the Counterclaim-Defendants have shown there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on
an essential element of Defendants' breach of fiduciary duty claim-the existence of a fiduciary
duty owed by Counterclaim-Defendants to Defendants-and Defendants have failed to point to
evidence showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Scarbrough, 240 Ga. App. at 830; O.C.G.A.
§9-11-56(e). BH Hasid, in its capacity as a member of the Subject Entities did not owe any
fiduciary duties to Addison Capital in its capacity as manager of the Subject Entities. Insofar as
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Hasid Holdings had no role in the Subject Entities, Defendants have not set forth any basis in law
or fact that would show Hasid Holdings owned Addison Capital any fiduciary duty.
Additionally, although Roni Avraham acting for BH Hasid replaced Kieffer and Addison Capital
as the manager of the Subject Entities, he had no role in the entities before Kieffer's removal
and, thus, the record does not reflect that he owed any fiduciary to Kieffer or Addison Capital.
Finally, Defendants have not shown any basis in law or fact that would suggest that BH Hasid, in
its capacity of a non-managing member of the entities, owed any fiduciary duty to Addison
Advisors. Accordingly, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRAN TED as to this
counterclaim.

ii)

Aiding and Abe/ling Breaches of Fiduciary Duty (against
Avraham)

Defendants allege that Avraham assisted BH Hasid in breaching its fiduciary duty,
contending that Avraham improperly held himself out to be the manager of the Subject Entities
and he accessed and took money from an account belonging to Addison Advisors, which was
meant to the be operating account of the Managed Entities, in order to pay himself a
management fee.
"Aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is recognized in Florida." Tumberry Vilt.
N. Tower Condo. Ass'n. Inc. v. Turnberry Yill. S. Tower Condo. Ass'n. Inc., 224 So. 3d 266, 267

n. 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Fonseca v. Taverna Imports. Inc., 212 So. 3d 431,442 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2017)). Such a claim requires the claimant to prove: (1) a fiduciary duty on the
part of a primary wrongdoer, (2) a breach of that fiduciary duty, (3) knowledge of the breach by
the alleged aider and abettor, and (4) the aider and abettor's substantial assistance or
encouragement of the wrongdoing." Id. See also Kahn v. Britt, 330 Ga. App. 377, 389, 765
S.E.2d 446,458 (2014)
28

Because the Court finds that the record does not reflect that Counterclaim-Defendants
owed Defendants any fiduciary duty, the counterclaim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary
duty fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
GRAN TED with respect to the aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim.

iii)

Breach ofthe Operating Agreements (against BH Hasid)

Defendants allege that BH Hasid violated the OAs by attempting to remove Addison
Capital as the Manager of the Subject Entities without following the requirements in their
respective operating agreement.
"The elements of an action for breach of contract are: (I) the existence of a contract, (2) a
breach of the contract, and (3) damages resulting from the breach." Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v.
Gregory. Inc., 16 So. 3d 979, 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Knowles v. C.I.T. Corp., 346
So.2d 1042, I 043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)). See also SAWS at Seven Hills. LLC v. Forestar Realty.
Inc., 342 Ga. App. 780, 784, 805 S.E.2d 270, 274 (2017) ("The elements for a breach of contract
claim in Georgia are the (1) breach and the (2) resultant damages (3) to the party who has the
right to complain about the contract being broken") (citing Dewrell Sacks. LLP v. Chicago Title
Ins. Co., 324 Ga. App. 219,223 (2) (a), 749 S.E.2d 802 (2013)).
Defendants have failed to establish the occurrence of a breach. The conduct underlying
this claim is Plaintiffs "attempt[] to remove Addison Capital as the Manager without following
the requirements of the operating agreements.'?" However, the record shows that Addison
Capital was the manager of the Subject Entities and Properties until April 12, 2018 when this
Court removed it from its position following the April 11-12, 2018 hearing. Even if this Court
assumes that the OAs, and more specifically, the removal provisions are valid and enforceable,
insofar as Plaintiff did not actually remove Addison Capital as the Manager of the Subject
29
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Entities and Properties, the Court finds that no breach of the OAs occurred. Accordingly, the
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to the breach of the operating
agreements counterclaim.

iv)

Defamation (against all counterclaim-defendants)

Defendants allege the Hasids and people close to them, including Avraham, have made
defamatory statements regarding Kieffer.
Under Florida law, "[t]he elements of a claim for defamation are as follows: (1)
publication; (2) falsity; (3) actor must act with knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity
on a matter concerning a public official, or at least negligently on a matter concerning a private
person; (4) actual damages; and (5) statement must be defamatory." Internet Sols. Corp. v.
Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1214 (Fla. 2010) (citing Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So.2d 1098,
1106 (Fla.2008)). See also Eason v. Marine Terminals Corp., 309 Ga. App. 669,672, 710 S.E.2d
867, 871 (2011).
Here, Defendants have not pointed to any evidence of a "specific statement" that is false
and defamatory that was made by any Counterclaim-Defendant and published to a third party.
Accordingly, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of the Counterclaim Defendants on the
counterclaim for defamation.

v)

Constructive Trust

According to Defendants' counterclaim, BH Hasid transferred $950,000 into Addison
Advisors to use as operating capital for the Subject Entities." The funds were maintained in an
account to which BH Hasid was a signatory." Defendants allege that November 15, 2017,
Avraham, acting as the agent for BH Hasid, improperly withdrew $376,000, the remaining
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balance in the account." They assert a constructive trust should be imposed on those funds "on
the basis that A vraham withdrew the money without the authorization of Addison Advisors,
Addison Capital acting as the Manager or [sic] the Managed Entities, or any of the Managed
Entities.'?" Alternatively, Defendants assert they are entitled to damages.

Under both Florida and Georgia law, a constructive trust is a remedial device created to
prevent unjust enrichment. See Provence v. Palm Beach Taverns, Inc., 676 So. 2d 1022, 1025
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (applying Florida law); Prof] Energy Mgmt.. Inc. v. Necaise, 300 Ga.
App. 223, 228, 684 S.E.2d 374, 380 (2009) (applying Georgia law). A constructive trust arises
not from the intent of the parties, but by equity with respect to property acquired by fraud, or
although acquired without fraud, where it is against equity that the property should be retained
by the one who holds it. See Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419, 422 (1927); Bunch v.
Byington, 292 Ga. App. 497, 503, 664 S.E.2d 842, 847 (2008).
Florida courts have held that "a constructive trust requires a showing of fraud, undue
influence, abuse of confidence or mistake." Meltzer v. Estate of Norrie, 705 So. 2d 967, 968
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). Similarly, under Georgia law a constructive trust "is not an
independent cause of action" but rather is a device by which property may be recovered if the
person holding the property was unjustly enriched. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 270 Ga.
136,508 S.E.2d 646 (1998). See also IO Ga. Jur. § 21:13 ("[C]onstructive trusts may be imposed
based on other conduct or circumstances, including bad faith, duress, coercion, undue influence,
abuse of confidence or violation of a fiduciary relationship, or mistake in the transaction that
originates the problem, by commission of a wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct,
artifice, concealment, or questionable means, by which one, in any way against equity and good
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conscience, either obtained or holds the legal right to property which this person ought not, in
equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy").
Here, Defendants have not asserted any claim or circumstance upon which to predicate its
request for the Court to impose a constructive trust. Insofar as they plainly allege the funds at
issue were transferred by BH Hasid and were to be used as "operating capital" for the Subject
Entities and whereas BH Hasid currently acts as the Manager of the Subject Entities, Defendants
have failed to establish any basis in fact or law as to why a constructive law is necessary "to
prevent unjust enrichment" or why Addison Capital would be entitled to damages regarding
same. Rather, as the current acting Manager, BH Hasid is authorized to access and use the
Subject Entities' operating capital, including the $376,000 at issue. The Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment is GRAN TED as to the counterclaim seeking a constructive trust.

vi)

Negligence

Defendants assert BH Hasid "had a duty to ensure that the [Subject] Entities were
properly capitalized to ensure they could continue to operate or be renovated to a point where
they could operate.'?' However, they allege BH Hasid "serially" left the Subject Entities undercapitalized or imposed "unreasonable requirement" on Addison Capital, causing Kieffer and
Addison Capital to finance several projects with outside loans, including a $9 million loan for
which Kieffer was a personal guarantor."
The four elements of common law negligence are (1) a legal duty owed by the defendant
to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty by the defendant, (3) an injury to the plaintiff legally and
proximately caused by the defendant's breach, and (4) damages as a result of the injury. See
Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210, 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Goldstein. Garber &
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Salama. LLC v. J.B., 300 Ga. 840, 841, 797 S.E.2d 87, 89 (2017).
Given that the Court has found that Addison Capital and Kieffer are not members of any
of the Subject Entities, any duties owed to them arise from their position as the manager of the
Subject Entities. Even assuming that Counterclaim-Defendants under-capitalized the Subject
Entities as alleged, Defendants have not cited to any duty owed to them as a non-member
manager to capitalize the Subject Entities nor any damages proximately suffered l;>y them as a
result of any undercapitalization. Although they allege Addison Capital had to finance several
projects with outside loans, it is undisputed those loans were taken out by one of the Subject
Entities. Further, although Kieffer personally guaranteed one of the loans, it is undisputed that
loan was repaid and Defendants have not identified any injury or damages suffered by them as a
result of the guaranty. Summ ary judgment is GRANTED to Counterclaim-Defendants on the
negligence counterclaim.

vii)

Punitive Damages and Attorneys' Fees

Insofar as none of the counterclaims survive the instant motion, the Court finds
Counterclaim-Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages and for attorney's fees under O.C.G.A. §136-11 fails as a matter of law. See Racette. 318 Ga. App. at 181 ("An award of attorney fees,

costs, and punitive damages is derivative of a plaintiffs substantive claims") ( citing
DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. v. Clemente, 294 Ga. App. 38, 52 (2008)).
CONCLUSION
Given all of the above, the Court orders as follows: Defendants' Motion to Stay is hereby
DENIED; Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Appeal is hereby GRANTED; Plaintiffs Amended
Motion for Accounting is hereby GRANTED; and Movant's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment is GRANTED as set forth above.
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SO ORDERED this

19.

day of February, 2019.

JUDGE ALICE D. BONNER
Superior Court of Fulton County
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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